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Game Over? How Video Game 
Console Makers are Speeding Toward 
an Antitrust Violation 
Clayton Alexander* 
ABSTRACT 
There has been a recent trend in the video game industry that console makers (Sony, 
Microsoft, and Nintendo) have been acquiring video game developers to make 
games solely for their console. With a surge of acquisitions, these three console 
makers have rapidly increased their market share of the console video game indus-
try. But in doing so, have they started to run afoul of antitrust law? Do these three 
console makers now have enough market power to exert control over the video 
game industry like a monopoly? This article seeks to answer these questions, while 
also suggesting several steps that console makers can take now to avoid the head-
ache that is an antitrust violation in the future. 
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2017. J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2021. Associate Member, Business, Entre-
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On August 19, 2019, Japanese entertainment conglomerate Sony announced 
that they had acquired video game developer Insomniac Games.1 The company be-
came the 14th video game studio bought by Sony to exclusively produce games for 
their PlayStation video game console since their creation in 1994.2 Just one month 
prior, Microsoft—software giant and maker of the PlayStation’s main competitor, 
the Xbox—announced the acquisition of Double Fine Productions.3 The acquisition 
was the 15th studio brought on to exclusively produce games for the Xbox.4 These 
acquisitions represent a new trend in the video game industry: console makers are 
focused on acquiring video game studios to exclusively produce titles for their re-
spective consoles (also called first-party developers or studios).5 In fact, Sony re-
cently stated it is currently on the hunt to acquire more video game studios.6 
There are several possible explanations for this new trend. Console makers may 
have vertically integrated as a way to compete with one another as differences be-
tween console hardware (historically where competition focused) have become in-
creasingly marginal.7 Having select video game franchises produce games solely 
for one console, or in other words, creating console exclusive video games, is one 
way to do so.8 As it currently stands, Microsoft fans cannot experience the Un-
charted or God of War series on the Xbox, and Sony fans do not have the oppor-
tunity to play through the Halo or Gears of War series on the PlayStation. While 
these actions may effectively fall within guise of “anti-competitive” activity (having 
a negative impact on the competitive market), is it flagrant enough to be an antitrust 
violation? 
What about other video game publishers and developers that must meet Sony, 
Microsoft, and Nintendo standards in order for their games to be allowed on con-
soles? As of 2018, the number of console gamers is estimated to be about 86.5 mil-
lion.9 Some games, such as the famous Kingdom Hearts series, appear only on con-
soles.10 If small producers could not meet their target console’s standards, then all 
the time and resources poured into developing and marketing the games would be 
 
 1. Samit Sarkar, Sony to acquire Insomniac Games, POLYGON (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.poly-
gon.com/2019/8/19/20812654/sony-buys-insomniac-games. 
 2. Press Release, Sony Interactive Entm’t, Sony Interactive Entertainment to Acquire Insomniac 
Games (Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.sie.com/en/corporate/release/2019/190820.html. 
 3. Ben Kuchera, Microsoft acquires Double Fine Productions, POLYGON (June 9, 2019), 
https://www.polygon.com/e3/2019/6/9/18658708/microsoft-acquires-double-fine-studios-e3-2019-
first-party. 
 4. Matt Booty, Double Fine Productions Joins Xbox Game Studios, XBOX.COM (June 9, 2019), 
https://news.xbox.com/en-us/2019/06/09/double-fine-productions-joins-xbox-game-studios/. 
 5. The Faceless Rebel, What Is the Difference between 1st, 2nd and 3rd party Developers, 
ARSTECHNICA (Jun. 13 2007, 1:42 AM), https://arstechnica.com/civis/viewtopic.php?t=206689. 
 6. Matt Purslow, Sony is Considering Studio Acquisitions Ahead of PS5, IGN (July 1, 2019), 
https://www.ign.com/articles/2019/07/01/sony-is-considering-studio-acquisitions-ahead-of-ps5. 
 7. Felicia Miranda, The best video game consoles of 2020, DIG. TRENDS (Mar. 27, 2020), 
https://www.digitaltrends.com/gaming/best-gaming-consoles/. 
 8. One of the biggest factors that consumers consider when purchasing a console is the scope of the 
console game library/exclusive content. See Matt Peckham, The Surprising Reasons People Buy the 
PlayStation 4, Xbox One or Wii U, TIME (Feb. 26, 2015), https://time.com/3723953/console-buyers/. 
 9. Dustin Bailey, 35% of Americans are PC gamers, PC GAMES N (Sept. 11, 2018), 
https://www.pcgamesn.com/pc-gamers-vs-console-gamers-numbers. 
 10. See, e.g., Square Enix Games, SQUARE ENIX, https://square-enix-games.com/en_US/games (last 
visited Jan. 14, 2020) (listing Kingdom Hearts III as available only on the Xbox One and PS4 consoles). 
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for naught; for a AAA game series like Kingdom Hearts,11 this amount would be at 
least $60 million.12 Does this preferential treatment for acquired studios like Insom-
niac and Double Fine run afoul of antitrust law? So far, that answer is no, but these 
console makers are inching ever closer toward crossing the line into violating the 
laws on vertical mergers. 
This article will examine whether the most popular major console makers—
Sony, Microsoft, and Nintendo—have violated, or come dangerously close to vio-
lating, antitrust laws on vertical mergers due to these acquisitions. Part II will briefly 
discuss the layout and some basic terminology of the video game industry. Part III 
will provide an overview of relevant antitrust law and its implementation. Part IV 
will examine whether there is a violation of antitrust laws on vertical mergers by 
these console makers. Lastly, Part V will go over preventive measures that console 
makers can take to avoid antitrust scrutiny. 
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE VIDEO GAME MARKET 
The console video game market is made up of two main components: consoles 
and video games. The three major console makers, Nintendo (makers of the Switch, 
Wii U, and 3DS),13 Microsoft (makers of the Xbox One and Xbox One S),14 and 
Sony (makers of the PlayStation 4 and PlayStation 4 Pro)15—hereafter referred to 
as the “Big Three”—make up more than 90% of worldwide video game console 
sales.16 Video games are made by video game developers (“studios”), of which there 
are two types: first-party and third-party.17 First-party video game developers are 
studios that are owned by one of the Big Three console makers and exclusively 
make games for that console.18 This includes reputable studios such as Naughty 
Dog (makers of the Uncharted series and The Last of Us),19 343 Studios (makers of 
the Halo franchise),20 and Nintendo (creators of Mario, Zelda, and Metroid).21 
Third-party studios, on the other hand, are not owned by a console maker, but in-
stead produce games for any number of consoles.22 Notable third-party studios 
 
 11. Traditionally, AAA games were defined as games that were released by “mega-sized publishers,” 
with Square Enix being one of those publishers. Rhys Pugatschew, Triple A Games: Defining What AAA 
Games Actually Are, NERDMUCH? (May 17, 2019), https://www.nerdmuch.com/games/170501/triple-
a-games/. 
 12. Superannuation, How Much Does It Cost To Make A Big Video Game?, KOTAKU (Jan. 15, 2014), 
https://kotaku.com/how-much-does-it-cost-to-make-a-big-video-game-1501413649. 
 
 13. Nintendo, NINTENDO, https://www.nintendo.com/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2019). 
 14. Welcome to Xbox Game Studios, XBOX.COM (Sept. 8, 2019), https://www.xbox.com/en-US/xbox-
game-studios 
 15. SIE Worldwide Studios, PLAYSTATION.COM (Sept. 8, 2019), https://www.playstation.com/en-
gb/footer/about-us/world-wide-studios/ 
 16. USA Yearly Chart: The year’s top-selling games at retail ranked by unit sales, VG CHARTZ, 
http://www.vgchartz.com/yearly/2019/USA/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2019). 
 17. The Faceless Rebel, supra note 5. 
 18. Id. 
 19. About, NAUGHTY DOG, https://www.naughtydog.com/company (last visited Mar. 31, 2020). 
 20. Welcome to Xbox Game Studios, XBOX.COM, https://www.xbox.com/en-US/xbox-game-studios 
(last visited Sept. 8, 2019). 
 21. Game Store, NINTENDO, https://www.nintendo.com/games/game-guide/ (last visited Mar. 15, 
2020). 
 22. The Faceless Rebel, supra note 5. 
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include Rockstar (makers of the Grand Theft Auto series),23 CD Project Red (mak-
ers of the Witcher series),24 Dice (makers of the Battlefield series),25 and Infinity 
Ward (makers of Call of Duty: Modern Warfare).26 
In addition to video game developers, there are also video game publishers—
entities that own several video game studios and focus on financing, marketing, and 
distributing video games.27 Notable video game publishers include Take Two Inter-
active (owners of Rockstar),28 Electronic Arts (“EA”) (owners of Dice and various 
sport games),29 and Activision (owners of Infinity Ward).30 While a video game 
developer can choose to self-publish,31 most studios go through a publisher.32 First-
party studios do not worry about publishers since the console makers also function 
as a video game publisher.33 
III. AN OVERVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAW 
Antitrust law covers a wide array of different anticompetitive acts. These range 
from things such as restrictions on trade, price gouging, to mergers and acquisitions. 
With a plethora of different acts covered by the antitrust law, it is important to focus 
on what specifically is at issue when it is in relation to video game studio acquisi-
tion. 
A. Relevant Governing Statutes 
At the federal level, there are two primary antitrust statutes: the Sherman Act 
and the Clayton Act.34 In general, § 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits the acquisition 
of another company if that acquisition would lead to a decrease in competition.35 
More specifically, the statute states that 
[n]o person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce 
shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or 
other share capital . . ., where in any line of commerce or in any activity 
affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such 
 
 23. ROCKSTAR, https://www.rockstargames.com/games (last visited Mar. 15, 2020). 
 24. CD PROJECT RED, https://en.cdprojektred.c¬om/ (last visited Mar 15, 2020). 
 25. Our Games, DICE, https://www.dice.se/games/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2020). 
 26. Our Games, INFINITY WARD, https://www.infinityward.com/games (last visited Mar. 15, 2020). 
 27. Paul Trowe, The Difference Between a Video Game Developer and Publisher, THE MEDIUM (Jun. 
16, 2018), https://medium.com/@PaulTrowe/the-difference-between-a-video-game-developer-and-
publisher-c6038324ee56. 
 28. TAKE TWO INTERACTIVE, https://www.take2games.com/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2020). 
 29. Worldwide Studios, ELECTRONIC ARTS, https://www.ea.com/studios (last visited Mar. 15, 2020). 
 30. Studios & Locations: Infinity Ward, ACTIVISION, https://www.activision.com/company/loca-
tions/infinity-ward (last visited Mar. 15, 2020). 
 31. CD PROJECT RED, supra note 24; Dan Pearson, CD Projekt RED: “Independence is a crucial part 
of our strategy,” GAMEINDUSTRY.BIZ (Mar. 7, 2013), https://www.gamesindustry.biz/articles/2013-03-
07-cd-projekt-independence-is-a-crucial-part-of-a-our-strategy. 
 32. Trowe, supra note 27. 
 33. Id. 
 34. The Antitrust Laws, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-
laws/antitrust-laws (last visited Mar. 15, 2020); Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2018); Clay-
ton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (2018). 
 35. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2018). 
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acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create 
a monopoly.36 
Here, console makers are buying up video game studios to exclusively develop 
games for their consoles.37 This affects commerce in that consumers cannot enjoy 
certain video games without also having to purchase the adjoining console. This 
also leads to concerns of anti-competitive behavior: if a console maker is able to 
gain enough market share in the video game industry, it can eventually compel com-
peting video game developers to yield to its demands, which is likely to result in 
anti-competitive results. 
B. TYPE OF MERGERS 
The next issue that needs to be determined is the type of merger created by 
console makers buying up first-party studios. The federal antitrust enforcers—De-
partment of Justice (“DOJ”), and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”)—has two 
established merger types: horizontal and non-horizontal.38 Horizontal mergers oc-
cur when two or more parties that compete in the same production market combine 
into one entity.39 An example of this is when J.D. Rockefeller used tactics to acquire 
all the surrounding oil fields, making him the sole supplier of oil.40 Non-horizontal 
mergers, on the other hand, have previously referred to two separate types of mer-
gers: vertical mergers and conglomerates.41 Both are mergers of two parties from 
distinct fields that combine to create a single entity.42 For example, during the late 
1800s, Scottish-American steel magnate Andrew Carnegie bought all the required 
infrastructure necessary to make steel, spanning from mining rights, to railroads, to 
the factories that actually produced the steel, all of which were combined into the 
Carnegie Steel Company.43 Non-horizontal mergers have historically been chal-
lenged far less by the DOJ compared to their horizontal counterparts.44 There are 
several reasons why,45 but the most prominent is that the DOJ has found that “non-
horizontal mergers are less likely than horizontal mergers to create competitive 
problems.”46 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. Richard Wakeling, Xbox’s New Studios Will Be Focused On Making Exclusive Games, GAMESPOT 
(Aug. 21, 2019), https://www.gamespot.com/articles/xboxs-new-studios-will-be-focused-on-making-
exclus/1100-6469279/; Robin Burks, Sony First-Party Games Might Not All Be Playstation Exclusives, 
SCREENRANT (Aug. 20, 2019), https://screenrant.com/sony-first-party-exclusive-platforms-pc/. 
 38. See Horizontal Merger Guidelines, DEP’T OF JUST. (Aug. 19, 2010), https://www.jus-
tice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2010/08/19/hmg-2010.pdf; Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 
DEP’T OF JUST. 1, https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1175141/download?mkwid=c (last visited Mar. 
15, 2020). 
 39. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS 
PRACTICE §12.1 (4th ed. 2011). 
 40. BRIA 16 2 b Rockefeller and the Standard Oil Monopoly, CONST. RTS. FOUND. (Jan. 14, 2020), 
https://www.crf-usa.org/bill-of-rights-in-action/bria-16-2-b-rockefeller-and-the-standard-oil-monop-
oly.html. 
 41. HOVENKAMP, supra note 39, at § 12.1. 
 42. Id. 
 43. United States Steel Corporation, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britan-
nica.com/topic/United-States-Steel-Corporation (last visited Mar. 15, 2020). 
 44. HOVENKAMP, supra note 39. 
 45. Id. at §9.5. 
 46. Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 38. 
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The acquisition of studios by console makers are vertical mergers. As men-
tioned previously, console markets and video game development markets are dis-
tinct from one another. If the issue was that a single video game studio was buying 
fellow studios, that would likely create a horizontal merger issue, because the enti-
ties at issue would share the same market. Further, the type of merger here is not 
likely to represent a conglomerate merger because even though such mergers occur 
between two firms in distinctly different markets, conglomerate mergers require 
that those distinct markets are not related in any capacity to one another.47 Put dif-
ferently, in a conglomerate merger, the products of one firm are not strategically 
related to the products of another firm. For example, if a console maker bought a 
company that made office chairs, this would likely be a conglomerate merger; while 
people may use office chairs to play video games on consoles, the chairs are not a 
necessary component to enjoying a video game console, and conversely, it is not 
necessary to own a video game console to use an office chair. That leaves the game 
studio acquisitions to be judged under vertical merger guidelines. Since video 
games and consoles are part of the same supply chain – video games serve as an 
input to video game consoles – the acquisition of those who make video games by 
the console makers are becoming more vertically integrated. This all supports the 
likelihood that console makers acquiring video game studios would be analyzed as 
a vertical merger. 
C.  Who Could Bring Suit? 
Once indicators reveal that an antitrust law issue, the next question is who could 
raise a concern over a violation. In general, most antitrust suits are brought by pri-
vate plaintiffs,48 though the federal government is the only entity able to bring crim-
inal charges.49 The federal government usually will not bring suit unless it is in 
violation of one of the merger guidelines.50 On the other hand, private plaintiffs 
bring antitrust suits at a much greater rate,51 but they run into two general prob-
lems:52 first, in order to bring an antitrust suit, plaintiffs must first satisfy the direct 
purchaser rule;53 second, the plaintiff must show an antitrust harm. 
The direct purchaser rule requires that the plaintiff be within one degree of 
separation from the antitrust harm.54 This generally serves as a prohibition against 
“pass-on,” which is when intermediaries shift the burden of an antitrust harm down 
the line of commerce.55 Potential plaintiffs within one degree of separation of harm 
include video game publishers who are now foreclosed from the opportunity to ac-
quire the studio themselves. For reasons discussed later, the size of the video game 
developer market is vast enough that the acquisition of a single studio is likely 
 
 47. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 39. 
 48. The Enforcers, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-
laws/enforcers (last visited Apr. 9, 2020). 
 49. Id. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See id. 
 52. E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY, AND PROCEDURE: 
CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS (7th ed. 2013). Chapter 4, I, A. 
 53. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 736. 
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insufficient to justify a foreclosure harm.56 The other potential plaintiff could be 
your average video game end consumer; the harm in this case would be that the end 
consumer is excluded from playing certain games without purchasing the requisite 
console (a concept called “tying”).57 While it was once debatable if ordinary end 
consumers are within a degree of separation should they buy the physical copy of 
the game (due to the presence of brick-and-mortar retailers), a recent court decision 
has firmly placed them within the degree of separation.58 In Apple v. Pepper, the 
Court found that those who purchased apps from the Apple App Store were within 
the necessary degree of separation.59 Since each console maker also operates a dig-
ital market place, similar to that of an app store, end consumers should have no 
problem satisfying the direct purchaser rule.60 
The second problem in bringing antitrust suits by private plaintiffs is establish-
ing an antitrust harm. This is especially the case in a § 7 claim since the harm alleged 
is more likely to be subtle.61 Typically, the alleged harms include firms who are 
charged a monopoly price due to a merger, a firm that struggles to maintain the 
efficiencies of a merged firm, or an independent distributor who lost a supplier.62 
In the video game industry, the harm being suffered is either the loss of a supplier 
or the inability to compete with the merged firm’s efficiency. The loss of a supplier 
comes from the fact that there is a decrease in the number of studios that produce 
games for all consoles. The inability to compete with efficiency comes from video 
game publishers who cannot produce games at the same quality or price as the con-
sole makers, though this harm will probably suffer for being too speculative. 
D. Determining Market Power 
One of the most difficult things to do in antitrust litigation is determining a 
firm’s market power.63 However, as the Supreme Court noted in duPont, “[d]eter-
mination of the relevant market is a necessary predicate to a finding of a violation 
of the Clayton Act because the threatened monopoly must be one which will sub-
stantially lessen competition ‘within the area of effective competition.’”64 To do 
this, courts generally participate in a three step process: (1) determining a relevant 
product market, (2) determining a relevant geographic market, and (3) computing 
the percentage output.65 
i. Determining the Relevant Product Market 
In determining the relevant product market, the goal is to find the smallest pos-
sible market that would be affected by a “small but significant nontransitory 
 
 56. See infra Part IV. 
 57. SULLIVAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 52. 
 58. Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 U.S. 1514 (2019). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. SULLIVAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 52. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 39, at §3.1. 
 64. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957) (citing Standard Oil 
Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 299 n. 5 (1949)). 
 65. HOVENKAMP, supra note 39, at § 3.8; See also Heerwagen v. Clear Channel Communications, 
435 F.3d 219, 227 (2d Cir. 2006). 
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increase in price” (“SSNIP”).66 For example, if Kellogg’s, the makers of the cereal 
Froot Loops, decides to increase the price of its cereal by 5%, what would consum-
ers do? More than likely, they will just buy the discount knock offs of Froot Loops, 
such as Tootie Fruities.67 The strong similarity of the substitutes makes this market 
too small to be the relevant product market.68 If we expand the seller’s power to 
increase the price on all fruit related cereals by 5%, consumers might just switch 
cereals to something like Cheerios or Frosted Flakes. Again, the relative similarity 
of the substitute products makes the market too small to deem relevant. 
But what if the price of all cereals increased by 5%? Consumers would likely 
be stuck paying the extra 5% because the alternatives—like waffles or fruit—are so 
different from the base market that consumers would rather pay the extra fee.69 It is 
at this point that a relevant product market is therefore determined.70 
In the case of video game console makers, there is at least an arguable case that 
there is a relevant product market. If the console makers were to increase the price 
of a certain franchise of games,71 such as Call of Duty, consumers would probably 
move on to another first-person shooter franchise,72 such as Battlefield. If console 
makers instead raised the price on an entire genre of games, such as first-person 
shooters, there would certainly be grumblings, but ultimately consumers would 
likely switch to other comparable genres, such as third-person shooters.73 
Now if console makes were to raise the price of all video games on their con-
soles, there are likely two viable outcomes: either consumers begrudgingly pay the 
higher price due to the perceived lack of alternatives, or they switch to playing video 
games in other ways, such as on their phone or personal computer (“PC”).74 The 
former would establish that the console video game market is the relevant product 
market; the latter would not. The issue with the latter is determining how reasonable 
it would be to switch to a different video game platform. 
At the moment, smartphones are not as powerful as current generation video 
game consoles (due to the relative lack of internal hardware capability), but that gap 
is closing.75 While PCs can possess similar (and in most cases, greater) internal 
 
 66. HOVENKAMP, supra note 39, at § 3.8a. 
 67. Mike Hughlett, Bagged Knockoff Cereals Taking Bites out of Name Brands’ Revenue, LA TIMES 
(June 24, 2012), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-xpm-2012-jun-24-la-fi-cereal-20120625-
story.html. 
 68. HOVENKAMP, supra note 39, at § 3.2. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. This is under the assumption that if the console makers were to raise the price of using their con-
sole to the various other publishers and developers, that those publishers and developers would pass-on 
the price increase to consumers. The issue of who would have standing to sue console makers will be 
addressed later on. 
 72. A first-person shooter is “a type of video game in which the player view the action through the 
eyes of a character and has to attack enemies.” First-person shooter, OXFORD LEARNER’S 
DICTIONARIES, https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/us/definition/english/first-person-
shooter?q=first+person+shooter (last visited Mar. 31, 2020). 
 73. A third-person shooter is “a game focused on shooting where, instead of seeing through the main 
character’s eyes, you see the main character from an external perspective.” Know you Genres: Third-
Person Shooters, XBOX WIRE (Oct. 9, 2015), https://news.xbox.com/en-us/2015/10/09/games-know-
your-genres-third-person-shooters/. 
 74. Keith Stuart, How Do I Start Playing Video Games? A beginner’s guide, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 
18, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/feb/18/how-do-i-start-playing-video-games-
a-beginners-guide. 
 75. Smartphones Will Soon Be More Powerful Than Game Consoles, STUFF (Feb. 22, 2016), 
https://www.stuff.co.nz/entertainment/games/77134952/. 
8
The Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review, Vol. 4 [2020], Iss. 1, Art. 46
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/betr/vol4/iss1/46
No. 1] Alexander: Video Game Consoles and Antitrust 159 
hardware capability compared to consoles,76 it is currently unreasonable to find a 
PC with comparable internal specifications at a similar price that can perform at a 
comparable level to consoles.77 This would render the alternatives to game consoles 
wholly unreasonable, and therefore not part of a reasonable product market. 
Another factor to consider in determining relevant product market is the ability 
of other sellers to enter into the market.78 If there is a rush of sellers that want to 
enter the market, the implication is that the market is controlled by a monopoly, and 
that the invading sellers want to take advantage of that opportunity.79 Conversely, 
if there is not a flux of new sellers joining the market, the implication is that either 
the market is perfectly competitive (meaning that there is not market to exploit) or 
that the barriers to entry are too high.80 
In the present case, there is steady stream of new video game developers into 
the market. This is made evident by the rise of “indie gaming,” which refers to an 
influx of small, upstart game studios.81 In terms of the console market, there has 
been a relative dearth of new competition to the Big Three with one notable excep-
tion: in late 2019, Google released Stadia, a gaming experience meant to rival game 
consoles by streaming all their games rather than providing a piece of hardware.82 
Since Google Stadia is new to the market, it is hard tell how it will affect the console 
market and the race for exclusives. 
ii. Determining Geographic Market 
Geographic market is the area in which a firm can fully exercise its market 
power.83 To determine a firm’s geographic market, courts generally see if a price 
increase in the potential area will either (1) encourage consumers to find a substitute 
outside the area, or (2) encourage producers to flood the market with substitute 
goods.84 In the current situation, the geographic market is likely the least conten-
tious aspect, since video games are carried and sold in stores nationwide. The geo-
graphic market for video games is analogous to the situation in United States v. 
Alcoa.85 In Alcoa, a producer of aluminum shipped and sold its product all across 
 
 76. “In short, then, today’s PCs will stomp all over the Xbox One (and PS4) in terms of raw compu-
tation power.” Sebastian Anthony, PlayStation 4 vs. Xbox One vs. PC: In depth specs comparison, IT 
PRO PORTAL (June 11, 2013), https://www.itproportal.com/2013/06/11/playstation-4-vs-xbox-one-vs-
pc-how-the-hardware-specs-stack-up/. 
 77. Brandon Hart, Good $500 Gaming PC Build vs. Xbox One X and PS4 Pro 2019, LEVEL SKIP (Jan. 
23, 2019), https://levelskip.com/consoles/400-gaming-pc-vs-console; See also Sebastian Anthony, Can 
You Build A Gaming PC Better Than the PS4 for $400?, EXTREME TECH (Nov. 18, 2013), 
https://www.extremetech.com/gaming/171158-can-you-build-a-gaming-pc-better-than-the-ps4-for-400 
(PC build could rival consoles in quality and price, but the optimization of consoles makes any raises 
concerns of comparability). 
 78. HOVENKAMP, supra note 39, at § 3.3. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Tracey Lien, How Indie Games Went Mainstream, POLYGON (Oct. 4, 2013), https://www.poly-
gon.com/2013/10/4/4768148/the-next-generation-of-indies. 
 82. Chris Morris, Google Stadia Goes Live in November, FORTUNE (June 6, 2019), https://for-
tune.com/2019/06/06/google-stadia-video-game-publishers/. 
 83. HOVENKAMP, supra note 39, at § 3.6. 
 84. Id.; See also Baxley-DeLamar v. American Cemetery Ass’n, 938 F.2d 846, 850 (8th Cir. 1991) 
(Geographic area is “the geographic area in which the defendant faces competition and to which con-
sumers can practically turn for alternative sources of the product). 
 85. U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
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the nation, leading the court to determine that the relevant geographic market for 
the product was nationwide.86 Similarly, since video games are sold and distributed 
across the nation, the relevant geographic market is nationwide. 
iii. Computing Market Share 
Conceptually, computing market share is straightforward—you simply take an 
individual firm’s output (in this case, console maker’s first-party developer games) 
and divide that by market output (all other games on consoles) over a set period of 
time.87 The tricky part comes with what inputs are used to determine a firm’s and 
market’s output. For example, to determine an individual firm’s output, do you use 
the number of units sold, or revenue? This comes down to the variability of price 
per unit between the firm and the market as a whole, and whether one of the two 
entities prove to be an outlier.88 A firm could sell a mere fraction of units that an 
average competitor would sell, but if the firm priced their units substantially higher 
than their competition, they could conceivably have a majority market share despite 
having actually sold less units than their competitors. The inverse is also possible: 
a firm can sell a disproportionately higher number of units compared to the average 
competitor, but if they undercharge for their product, they can have the majority 
market share in output without the market share in revenue. 
Another issue is whether to use output or capacity to determine market output. 
Output is simply what the market actually produced, while capacity refers to the 
maximum amount that the market could theoretically produce.89 While using actual 
output seems intuitive, there are shortcomings that arise out of using output that 
does not happen when using capacity. If most firms in the market are producing 
output at an inefficient level, and the firm in question is producing output effi-
ciently, then the efficient firm is penalized by being treated as a monopoly, despite 
the likelihood that they would be viewed as a normal firm in a competitive, efficient 
market.90 
One of the key economic goals of antitrust legislation is to punish inefficient 
market behavior by firms,91 and using only market output as a measurement penal-
izes desired behavior.92 Instead, if market capacity was used as the measurement, 
then the calculations involving the inefficient firms would be corrected, ultimately 
not penalizing competitively efficient firms.93 Using market capacity has its own 
drawbacks, with one of the biggest being that it is a poor measurement in light of 
real-world circumstances. There could be extenuating circumstances that make typ-
ically efficient output producing firms become inefficient, such as changes in a law 
that require new measures for compliance, natural disasters, etc.94 Both situations 
are incredibly rare though, and as long as they are accounted for when computing 
market share, it should not be an issue.95 
 
 86. Id. 
 87. HOVENKAMP, supra note 39, at § 3.7. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at § 3.7a. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at § 3.7b. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
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According to DOJ guidelines, there is a preference to using revenue as the 
measurement for the numerator since “they reflect the real-world ability of firms to 
surmount all of the obstacles necessary to offer products on terms and conditions 
that are attractive to customers.”96 In regards to capacity versus output, DOJ has 
indicated that “capacities or reserves may better reflect the future competitive sig-
nificance of suppliers than revenues, and the Agencies may calculate market shares 
using those measures.”97 
In the present case, first-party developers have constituted 30.86% of all video 
game sales over the past five years.98 Additionally, their total unit output and market 
share percentage has increased every year since 2015, with the most recent year 
showing a 40.26% market share.99 
IV. DETERMINING AN ANTITRUST VIOLATION 
With both the type of merger defined (vertical) and the market share estab-
lished, we are prepared to examine whether any of the Big Three have violated 
antitrust law. In general, for vertical mergers, courts look at four factors: (1) whether 
competitors of the supplier or the buyer will be foreclosed from the market, (2) 
whether there is a trend towards vertical integration in the market, (3) whether there 
is an intent to foreclose competition, and (4) whether barriers to entry are erected 
foreclosing equal access to markets.100 Courts do not always adhere strictly to the 
four-factor test, and sometimes, courts also use a more holistic analysis that com-
pares the pro-competitive benefits of a merger against the anti-competitive con-
cerns.101 When applying this holistic approach, courts complete their analysis 
through the perspective of an end consumer; in other words, the analysis of the 
effects on competition is not directly concerned with the well-being of competitors, 
but rather that of the consumers.102 Either way, the process is an intensive fact-based 
determination.103 
A. Anti-Competitive Concerns 
There are several anti-competitive concerns that arise when there is a tentative 
vertical merger. These concerns fall into three main categories: (1) strategic control 
of inputs, (2) price discrimination, and (3) foreclosure to entry barriers. 
i. Strategic Control of Inputs 
When a company begins a vertical merger, they start to gain greater market 
pressure. By controlling the inputs of an industry, a firm can keep their competitors 
from acquiring the same inputs that they need to be able to operate.104 For the case 
 
 96. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 38. 
 97. Id. 
 98. USA Yearly Chart, supra note 16. 
 99. Id. 
 100. BRENT A. OLSON, SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT—VERTICAL MERGERS § 22:67 (2019). 
 101. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 486 (1992). 
 102. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485 (1977). 
 103. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 
 104. HOVENKAMP, supra note 39, at § 9.3b. 
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at hand, if a console maker starts acquiring game studios in bulk, then that will 
prevent other game publishers and even other console makers from acquiring video 
games from that studio. That would be a deprivation of that input in the video game 
market. This is noticeable today by the quality of the inputs becoming exclusive. 
Games that critically renowned, such as the recent God of War, are exclusive to one 
console, and are thereby depriving others from being able to sell the game on their 
console.105 There is also the issue of how strategically controlling the inputs can 
affect the downstream market. By controlling more intermediate steps of the selling 
process, the merging business can begin to flex power not just as a single business 
entity, but as an entire commerce chain.106 For example, Sony would be able to tell 
game publisher EA that they will not list an EA game on their online store unless 
EA produced games solely for Sony consoles. This might pressure physical retailers 
to either hide the game or remove it from their shelves all together. 
ii. Price Discrimination 
Another anti-competitive tool that the ‘Big Three’ could use is outright price 
discrimination. Price discrimination occurs when a company charges different cus-
tomers different prices for the same product.107 This is a concern with vertical mer-
gers due to the fact that companies, merely by selling their products to different 
industries, can price discriminate in multiple markets.108 For example, a firm that 
makes video games can charge the manufacturer suggested retail price (“MSRP”) 
at brick and mortar stores, but then proceed to sell the same video games for a steep 
discount on their own digital stores. The concern about price fixing is that it pro-
duces highly inefficient results that seem patently unfair.109 By charging different 
prices, it raises two key problems that promote inefficiency: the motivated buyer 
problem and promoting the use of arbitrage. 
The first problem is that discriminatory pricing does not always permit the most 
motivated buyer to actually obtain the product.110 For example, if a customer wants 
to buy a game from a brick and mortar store, where the average price tends to be 
$60, but the customer only has the ability to pay $54, then the customer will not be 
able to obtain the product. In contrast, if the same game is available online on the 
digital store of one of the ‘Big Three’ at $40, and the customer was willing to pay 
up to $45 to obtain the game, that customer is still able to acquire the game. In this 
example, even though the first customer valued the product more, they were unable 
to obtain the game, while the second customer, who valued the same product for 
less, was able to obtain it. This leads to an inefficient (and facially unfair) result, in 
that the person who values the product less was able to obtain the product over the 
person who valued it more. 
 
 105. Based on its high Metacritic score, which is a reviewer conglomerate score, God of War is one of 
the highest rated games of the past decade. See God of War, METACRITIC, https://www.meta-
critic.com/game/playstation-4/god-of-war (last visited Apr. 9, 2020). 
 106. Michael Salinger, Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure, 103 Q.J. ECON. 345, 354–55 (1988). 
 107. Matthew A. Edwards, Price and Prejudice: The Case Against Consumer Equality in the Infor-
mation Age, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 559, 560 (2006). 
 108. HOVENKAMP, supra note 39, at § 9.3b. 
 109. Edwards, supra note 107, at 583–84. 
 110. Id. at 559. 
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The second problem with price discrimination is that it promotes the use of 
arbitrage.111 Arbitrage occurs when a retailer buys up a product at a discounted rate, 
then proceeds to sell that product at a slightly lower price than their competitor, in 
order to gain sales.112 This concept is best illustrated through an example. Say that 
an individual buys a video game on from a digital store for $40, receiving a digital 
download code. The individual then takes the digital code, writes it down, and opens 
a stall next to the brick and mortar store selling the download code to these games. 
The individual chooses to sell these codes at a price of $55, which is less the brick 
mortar store using the MSRP of $60. By offering a discount for the same product 
as the brick and mortar store, the individual profits $15 per sale while depriving the 
brick and mortar store a sale. While the net decrease in price might seem like a 
benefit to the consumer since they are getting the product they want at a cheaper 
price, they have contributed to the creation of a new issue: a rise in this informal, 
unregulated market. The potential for arbitrage also coincides with a rise in unreg-
ulated startups that focus solely on a quick profit turnaround.113 These businesses 
present opportunities for unsavory companies to take advantage of consumers due 
to the lack of regulation and oversight.114 
iii. Foreclosure and Entry Barriers 
By increasing the amount of inputs necessary to operate a business in a market, 
the entry barriers to that market are increased.115 Some markets naturally have 
higher barriers of entry compared to others.116 For example, the barriers to entry for 
video game console makers are likely significant due to the costs of setting up fac-
tories to assemble the consoles, research and development of components to make 
the console, marketing the console, and the most recent requirement of having some 
type of exclusive game for your console.117 By contrast, the barriers to entry into 
the video game market are likely low due to the fact that games can be created with 
open source software that is free to the public.118 The concern with vertical mergers 
is that for future video game developers to be profitable, they likely either have to 
sell exclusively to one console maker or create their own console. By having a tight 
grip over the console market, and expanding into video games creation, console 
makers have the leverage to force game developers into exclusive arrangements,119 
which hurt consumers in the end.120 This is because customers are either deprived 
of the ability to experience a game, due to lacking a given console, or incurring 
steep expenses in obtaining multiple consoles to play all of these exclusive games. 
 
 111. Frank Partnoy, The Law of Two Prices: Regulatory Arbitrage, Revisited, 107 GEO. L.J. 1017, 1019 
(2019). 
 112. Id. 
 113. See id. (“So long as the relevant regulation is in place and some market participants continue to 
trade the regulated good, a price difference between a regulated and unregulated good is likely to per-
sist.”). 
 114. Id. at 1027. 
 115. HOVENKAMP, supra note 39, at §9.4. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Salinger, supra note 106, at 346. 
 119. Id.; Kyle Orland, The rise and fall (and rise and fall) of gaming’s third-party exclusives, 
ARSTECHNICA (Aug. 13, 2014, 1:30 PM), https://arstechnica.com/gaming/2014/08/the-rise-and-fall-
and-rise-and-fall-of-gamings-third-party-exclusives/. 
 120. HOVENKAMP, supra note 39, at §9.2b. 
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B. Pro-Competitive Benefits 
In stark contrast to fears of vertical mergers decreasing competition, they also 
have the capacity to benefit the consumer market. In general, there are two major 
pro-competitive benefits of a vertical merger: reducing transaction costs and elimi-
nating double marginalization. 
A merged business needs less coordination with outside companies, and can 
instead rely on its own resources.121 The ability of a company to dictate its own 
delivery times, shipping quotas, and quality standards helps improve a company’s 
efficiency and quality.122 This leads to a reduction of transaction costs, which could 
potentially lead to lower prices.123 
The other pro-competitive benefit is that a vertical merger eliminates double 
marginalization, which is the “exercise of market power at successive vertical layers 
in a supply chain.”124 For example, assume that a consumer wants to buy a printer 
with some ink. The printer and the ink are made by two separate companies. The 
consumer is willing to spend up to $300 to get a printer with some ink. The cost of 
the printer is $250 while the ink costs $30. In a perfectly competitive market, when 
both the printer and ink manufacturer do not have market power, that is the end of 
the story; the consumer makes their respective purchases and walks away with $20 
surplus value. However, if one of the two entities has market power, the analysis 
does not stop at the consumer receiving that surplus value. Assume that the printer 
manufacturer has market power, but the ink manufacturer does not. In this case, the 
printer manufacturer will increase its price to capture that $20 surplus, raising the 
printer price to $270, making the whole package $300. This is a single marginali-
zation, which is still a fair result, since the consumer is walking away with the prod-
uct at their maximum value of the product. If, however, both the printer and ink 
manufacturer have market power, then we run into double marginalization. In this 
case, both the ink and printer manufacturer will increase their price to capture that 
$20 surplus, and without coordination, will each raise the price of their product by 
$20. That would make the entire package cost $320, exceeding the customer’s max-
imum price and leading to a lost sale. In this scenario, everyone loses: the consumer 
does not get their desired product, and both manufacturers lose out on a sale. 
This last scenario could have been avoided with coordination, thus illustrating 
why vertical integration is important.125 Vertical integration would have allowed 
the ink and printer manufacturer to coordinate their prices to capture the most 
amount of surplus while still getting the sale.126 Vertical integration ensures that the 
consumer gets their desired product and also incentivizes businesses to create more 
products that consumers want.127 If businesses know that they can capture all the 
consumer surplus through vertical integration, then they will continue to produce 
products that will incur repeat customers.128 
 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Career Anna, Double Marginalization: Supply Chain Management Concept, CAREER ANNA (July 
4, 2015), https://www.careeranna.com/articles/double-marginalization/. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Thomas A. Lambert, Appropriate Liability Rules for Tying and Bundled Discounting, 72 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 909, 955 (2011). 
 128. Id. 
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C. Four Factor Analysis 
In addition to the analysis on the competitive effects of a merger, there are four 
general factors that courts look at to determine whether a merger is in fact an anti-
trust violation.129 Courts look at whether the merger will result in (1) future foreclo-
sure from a market, (2) a trend toward integration, (3) intent to foreclose others from 
the market, and (4) creating greater entry barriers that lead to foreclosure.130 
i. Foreclosure from the Market 
Foreclosure from the market is intuitive: it considers whether a console maker 
buying video game studios forecloses competitors from entering the video game 
market. The competitors in this case would be various video game publishers and 
independent studios. Strictly speaking, console makers buying video game studios 
does not preclude other studios from developing games on consoles. Video game 
publishers and independent studios frequently produce games for multiple consoles; 
in fact, some of the best-selling games owe their popularity to being available on 
all consoles, and not being tied down with exclusive deals.131 Therefore, the facts 
in this analysis tend to show that there is a lack of an anti-competitive effect. 
ii. Trend Toward Vertical Integration 
For the second factor, courts look at the behavior of the firms in question to 
determine whether they have showed a pattern of actions that amount to increasing 
vertical integration.132 Examining recent actions taken by console makers, it seems 
clear that there is an increasing trend toward vertical integration.133 Two of the larg-
est console makers, Sony and Microsoft, acquired reputable third-party studios in 
2019.134 By doing so, the two console makers now have more first-party studios 
than ever before.135 With each acquisition, console makers increase their market 
share in the video game market, thereby also increasing the degree of vertical inte-
gration. For example, Sony’s recent acquisition of Insomniac Games increased their 
market share in 2019 by 5%.136 The amount of acquisitions does not seem to be 
stopping anytime soon. Microsoft’s desire to create more profitable exclusive 
games,137 and Sony’s expressed desire to acquire more first-party studios,138 indi-
cate that the trend will continue for the foreseeable future. Taking this into account, 
 
 129. OLSON, supra note 100, § 22:67. 
 130. Id. 
 131. This can be seen in that the majority of the top ten selling each year are sold across multiple 
consoles. USA Yearly Chart, supra note 16. 
 132. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 39. 
 133. See id. 
 134. Kuchera, supra note 3; Samit Sarkar, Sony to acquire Insomniac Games, POLYGON (Aug. 19, 
2019), https://www.polygon.com/2019/8/19/20812654/sony-buys-insomniac-games. 
 135. Welcome to Xbox Game Studios, XBOX.COM (Sept. 8, 2019), https://www.xbox.com/en-US/xbox-
game-studios; SIE Worldwide Studios, PLAYSTATION.COM (Sept. 8, 2019), 
https://www.playstation.com/en-gb/footer/about-us/world-wide-studios/ 
 136. This is due to the impact of the game that Insomniac released that year, Spiderman. USA Yearly 
Chart, supra note 16. 
 137. Kuchera, supra note 3. 
 138. Purslow, supra note 6. 
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it is likely that a court would view the actions by console makers as trending toward 
vertical integration. 
iii. Intent to Foreclose Competition 
The third factor, intent to foreclose competition, is likely the trickiest factor to 
evaluate. The purpose of this factor is to determine whether a firm intends to restrict 
competition to their benefit.139 Courts have also determined that intent can be in-
ferred from actions without any overt type of agreement.140 At the moment, none of 
the ‘Big Three’ have come out to explicitly say that they intend to either force out 
or acquire various video game publishers and independent studios. However, find-
ing evidence of a blatant agreement that physically exists is incredibly rare.141 In 
other words, it is unlikely that businesses are foolish enough to put an illegal agree-
ment in writing and preserve it.142 Therefore, most analyses done for intent are con-
ducted by examining a firm’s actions.143 
In the past, the ‘Big Three’ have repeatedly stated that third-party support is 
crucial for the survival of their consoles.144 It is no surprise that the most recent 
console that struggled to remain viable, the Nintendo Wii U, had the weakest third-
party support of a console in over a decade.145 This seems to indicate a lack of intent 
to vertically integrate due to importance of third-party support. 
Recent trends, however, cast some doubt as to whether console makers believe 
in the necessity of independent third-party studios. One of the newest trends in the 
video game industry is the use of exclusive deals, wherein video game publishers 
will offer some type of benefit to purchase a game on a certain console.146 These 
benefits range from trivial things such as some type of exclusive in-game cosmetic 
item, to more concerning benefits such as additional in-game story content.147 While 
these exclusive deals are not in perpetuity, the increasing trend of using them should 
raise concerns of future integration. For lack of a better phrase, exclusive deals are 
a gateway to vertical integration. So, while the increasing amount of exclusive deals 
may be cause for concern, there is likely still a gap between exclusive deal agree-
ments and complete vertical integration. 
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iv. Erection of Barriers to Entry that Foreclose from Mar-
ket 
For the final factor, courts will look at whether a proposed merger creates ad-
ditional barriers to entry that foreclose the market.148 Barriers of entry are compo-
nents that are necessary to operate in a given market.149 For example, consider the 
oil industry: you cannot operate in the oil industry without an oil well, so having 
the capital necessary to either purchase or build an oil well is necessary to enter the 
oil industry. In our analysis, the question becomes whether the console makers ac-
quisition of first-party studios has led to an increase of entry barriers in the video 
game industry. 
At the moment, the answer is likely that there has not been an increase in entry 
barriers. There is no evidence that entry barriers have raised in video game devel-
opment due to acquisitions of first-party studios. While there is not a current issue, 
it is not hard to foresee an increase in barriers in the future. For example, if console 
makers add more requirements to have games be playable on their console or make 
the current requirements more difficult to comply with, while also giving support 
or an outright pass on compliance with these new requirements to their first-party 
studios, this may represent a barrier to entry. 
D. Evaluation 
The most pertinent part of the conversation now becomes whether the ‘Big 
Three’ are in violation of antitrust laws by using vertical mergers to inflict anti-
competitive effects on consumers. One of the first things to consider is their ability 
to effectively enforce any anti-competitive effect through their market power. With 
only 30.86% market share in the video game market,150 it is arguable that since the 
‘Big Three’ do not control a third of the market, they could not effectively use their 
market power to implement anti-competitive effects. However, the Supreme Court 
has held differently.151 In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, the Court found that the 
defendant company had instituted anti-competitive effects on consumers with only 
5% market share.152 
While the ‘Big Three’ theoretically have the market share necessary to institute 
an anti-competitive effect, the next concern is whether they can practically imple-
ment it. They have mostly avoided anti-competitive scrutiny due to the presence of 
competing video game publishers to keep them in check. Video game publishers 
make up roughly 40% of the market share for video game console sales.153 It is the 
strength of these publishers, especially since they reliably create a third of the top 
ten selling games each year,154 that keep a check on the console makers ability to 
institute anti-competitive effects. By maintaining a significant market share, these 
publishers can easily battle back against any strategic limitation of inputs 
 
 148. OLSON, supra note 100, § 22:67. 
 149. HOVENKAMP, supra note 39, at §9.4b. 
 150. USA Yearly Chart, supra note 16. 
 151. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). 
 152. Id. 
 153. USA Yearly Chart, supra note 16. 
 154. Id. 
17
Alexander: Game Over? How Video Game Console Makers are Speeding Toward an A
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2020
168 B.E.T.R. [Vol. 4 2020 
established by video game developers. In addition, any attempt to implement price 
discrimination would be met with the threat of removing publishers’ games from 
those platforms, which would be economically disastrous to the console develop-
ers.155 Lastly, the entry barriers are likely to remain stable, due again to threats by 
publishers to withhold games from the consoles. Thanks to the presence of strong 
video game publishers, console makers are disincentivized from implementing anti-
competitive effects through their increasing video game developer acquisitions. 
V. PREVENTATIVE MEASURES TO AVOID ANTITRUST SCRUTINY 
How long can the video game publishers maintain the status quo in holding 
back the anti-competitive effects of video game console makers? First-party studios 
have been steadily increasing their market share since 2015.156 In addition, the 
stated intention of the ‘Big Three’ to acquire more first-party studios will only has-
ten the increase of market share by these console makers.157 If the console makers 
are able to reach a point where they can economically survive on the sales of their 
first-party studio games and those that have exclusive dealings with that studio, then 
the Big Three can leverage the various video game publishers to acquiesce to their 
anti-competitive demands, and ultimately harm the consumer. At that point, it is 
undoubtable that the either the federal government, or possibly a brave publisher, 
will bring an antitrust suit against the ‘Big Three.’ What can they do, either now or 
before the potential suit, to satisfy the concerns of anti-competitive practices? 
The key to avoiding most antitrust suits is ensuring that all actions benefit con-
sumers at the end of the day.158 The biggest pro-consumer measure that the ‘Big 
Three’ can implement is allowing their first-party studios to develop games that are 
available on all platforms. This would allow consumers to choose a console without 
the concern about the availability of games, forcing console makers to compete 
based on the quality of their consoles, and not about the list of exclusive video game 
studios. Including a time period of sole exclusivity to first-party studio games may 
make this more feasible to the console makers and cause them to soften their stance 
on this issue. This provides some incentive to pick a certain console over another,159 
but because consumers know that it will eventually reach all consoles, they now 
have the choice of whether they either patiently wait for the game to release or make 
another console purchase. 
Another possible solution is to divest control over the various digital video 
game marketplaces.160 Since the ‘Big Three’ also control the digital marketplaces 
on their various consoles,161 they can easily skew the market showings to favor their 
proprietary games over those of various video game publishers, even if those games 
end up being derivative, overpriced, and of a lower quality than the publisher’s 
games. The ability to effectively suppress the games of competing video game 
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 158. Spencer Weber Waller, The Past, Present, and Future of Monopolization Remedies, 76 Antitrust 
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 159. NPD: PS3 sales spike on MGS4, GAMESPOT (July 17, 2008), https://www.gamespot.com/arti-
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 161. Id. at 24. 
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publishers is arguably too great and could eventually need to be curtailed. By di-
vesting ownership of the digital marketplace to outside companies, the ‘Big Three’ 
would be forced to compete on a more even playing field to reach the featured sec-
tion on a third-party marketplace. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
While the video game console makers are likely not in violation of antitrust 
laws at the moment due to acquiring more first-party studios, the trend of these first-
party studios gaining more market share could eventually put them in the crosshairs 
of antitrust regulators, and they will need a plan to avoid their ire. 
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